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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 








NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an 




PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability 
company, DAN JACOBSON, an 
individual, SAGE HOLDINGS LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability 
company, TIMBERLINE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
STEVEN G. LAZAR, an individual, 
an individual, AMY KORENGUT, an 
individual, HLT REAL ESTATE 
LLC, PANHANDLE STATE BANK, an 
Idaho corporation, R.E. LOANS, 
LLC, a California limited 
liability company, WELLS FARGO 
FOOTHILL, INC, a Delaware 
corporation, PEND OREILLE 
BONNER DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS, 
) 
) DOCKET NO. 42479 
) 
) (Bonner County 
) Case 2011-0135) 
) 



































INC., a Nevada corporation, ) 
PENSCO TRUST CO. custodian ) 
f/b/a Barney Ng, a California ) 
corporation, MORTGAGE FUND '08 ) 
LLC, a California limited ) 
liability company, B-K ) 
LIGHTING, INC., a California ) 
corporation, FREDERICK J. ) 
GRANT, an individual, CHRISTINE ) 
GRANT, an individual, RUSS ) 
CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, an Arizona ) 
limited liability company, ) 
JOSEPH DUSSICH, an individual, ) 
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK, an Idaho ) 
corporation, STATE OF IDAHO, } 
Department of Revenue and } 
Taxation, MONTAHENO INVESTMENTS } 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability } 
company, TOYON INVESTMENTS LLC, } 
a Nevada limited liability } 
company, CHARLES W. REEVES and } 
ANN B. REEVES, husband and ) 
wife, ACI NORTHWEST, INC . , an } 
Idaho corporation, DOES 1 ) 




* * * * * 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonner 
* * * * * 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL GRIFFIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
* * * * * 
Gary A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Attorney for Appellant, JV 
Christopher Pooser 
Stoehl Rives, LLC 
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900 
Boise, ID 83702-7705 
Attorney for Respondent, Bank 
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COMES NOW the Appellant, J.V., LLC, and files its REPLY 
brief, as follows: 
DENIAL OF JV'S MOTION FOR J'uDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
The Respondent's Brief, in the Section V. Argument, 
heading~' argues that on JV's Motion For Judgment on the 
pleadings, the District Court did not consider "any matters 
outside of the pleadings" and that the District Court 
properly denied JV's Motion. The Respondent's Brief fails 
to recite the actual facts that the Bank's First Amended 
Complaint did not allege the word "subordinate" or any words 
of fact as to how or why the Bank's Mortgage recorded August 
6, 2008 could be senior to JV's Mortgage recorded June 19, 
2006. 
The Bank's pleading, Second Claim for Relief was in 
paragraph 5 seeking "For a determination that the lien 
created by the Note and Mortgage is valid, enforceable and 
existing as against the Defendants and the property 
described therein and for a decree of foreclosure." (R. Vol. 
I, p. 135, p.5}. There was not pleading of any particular 
priority of the Bank's recorded Mortgage, which was 
recorded, in 2008, over a year later than JV's Mortgage 
recorded in 2006. So, there is no way the pleadings 
disclosed a theory, factually or legally, as to how the 
Bank's Mortgage could have priority over JV's Mortgage. 
Idaho law is clear that the prayer for relief is not 
of the cause of action. As stated in JV's Appellant's 
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Brief, the prayer of a complaint is nothing more than a 
statement of the pleader's opinion of what the facts stated 
in the Bank's amended complaint, without dispute alleged 
JV's Mortgage recorded in 2006 would be prior to the Bank's 
Mortgage recorded in 2008. The prayer forms no part of a 
statement of a cause of action, facts alleged and not the 
relief demanded are of chief important. 
In summary, no part of the Bank's Respondent's Brief 
submits any facts or law, as to its later recorded Mortgage 
could be superior to JV's Mortgage. Idaho's race/notice 
statutes give priority to the first in time recording. The 
"Subordination Agreement" was totally outside and missing 
from the facts alleged even considering the standard that 
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing the 
pleader is entitled to relief. 
Respondent's Brief claims that its Mortgage recorded in 
2008 had priority by reason of subordination. 
B. Respondents Bank claims the District Court's 
decision on summary judgment was correct. The Legal 
Standards were correctly set forth by the District Court, 
but the District Court was in error to hold that the facts 
entitled the Bank to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The District Court only expressed its conclusions. The 
facts were at issue and disputed on the record. JV's 
Affidavit of James W. Berry was lengthy and factual that the 
Bank gave no consideration, JV had no contract or agreement 
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with the Bank. Charles Reeves for the land owner, POBD, 
obtained JV's signature based on fraudulent 
misrepresentations. The Subordination Agreement had a place 
for the Bank Officer's signature, which was unsigned and 
remain in blank. The Bank submitted nothing in dispute of 
the Affidavit of James Berry. The Respondent's Brief, page 
10, cites the rule that "based on undisputed evidence ... the 
Court can make "inferences". That theory of law does not 
apply because the facts and evidence were entirely in 
dispute. 
The District Court was short on findings, only 
concluding that a valid subordination (sic} contract was 
entered into by which JV's mortgage was made inferior to 
UB's Mortgage. The Subordination Agreement was not signed 
and recorded until August 6, 2008, a copy of it is on page 
086 of Respondent's Brief as an appendix. The Subordination 
Agreement could not be an inducement for the Bank to loan 
POBD $5.0 million dollars, because the money loan occurred 
in October of 2007, with no mortgage, then the loan was 
renewed by a new mortgage on the real estate recorded March 
25, 2008. The Subordination Agreement was long after the 
Bank Loans, and the Bank's Mortgage was recorded four (4) 
months ahead of the Subordination Agreement. 
The Respondent Bank, paragraph B. 1. claims that JV 
presented no legal authority on its argument that summary 
judgment was improper, which is not accurate. JV's 
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Appellant's Brief, on its issue II, covers pages 14 through 
19, and it uses the facts from the record, and the 
applicable law. With all of JV's Affidavit facts undisputed 
or contested in any way, the District Court's summary 
judgment is reversible error. 
In JV's caption III, JV submitted that on its Motion To 
Alter, Amend, and Reconsider, the District Court erred by 
refusing to consider additional facts, being 3 letters from 
POBD's Attorney, Mr. Sterling. The 3 email letters from 
Attorney Sterling were to induce JV to subordinate its first 
lien Mortgage. The District Judge did not permit those 
email letters and the facts therein contained to be admitted 
at all, but he gave no reasons for that ruling. JV's 
Respondent's Brief, pages 24 through 29, in detail shows 
facts that the representations of Sterling's 3 email letters 
were false. The Bank's response is at paragraph C, page 24 
of Respondent's Brief stating that JV's new evidence failed 
to raise an issue of fact. JV submits that the District 
Judge refused to consider the new evidence. Decisions on 
summary judgments are interlocutory in the sense that the 
facts and issues can be reconsidered at any time, within 
fourteen (14) days of the final judgment. Rule ll(a} (2) (B) 
Motion For Reconsideration, a motion to reconsider any 
interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any 
, but not later than 14 after entry of 
judgment. In the Amended and , R. VII., 
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p. 1479, the District Court, end of the first paragraph, 
stated the Court ... will not consider the three 3-mails; 
however, no reason was given. 
The rule is stated in Idaho First National v. David 
Steed, 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992) that on a Rule 
ll(a) (2) (B) a party filing a motion to reconsider may submit 
additional new facts, which the Court must consider in 
ruling on JV's Motion to Reconsider. A summary judgment is 
interlocutory as no final judgment exists. "The order 
granting summary judgment was an interlocutory order, not a 
final order" (Idaho First National v. David Steed, 121 Idaho 
356 at 361). For example, in Coeur d'Alene Mining v. First 
National Bank 0£ Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026, the 
Supreme Court noted that when presented with a motion for 
reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. ll(a) (2) (B) "the trial court should take into 
account any new facts presently by the moving party that 
bear on the correctness of an interlocutory order." (Coeur 
d'Alene Mining v. First National Bank 0£ Idaho, 118 Idaho at 
823. 
The Bank submits the Court's refusal to exclude the 
emails was harmless. (Respondent Brief p. 26) JV's 
Appellant's Brief, pages 23 through 29, analyzes each 
separate email and points out that the facts and 
representations made POBD's were false 
inducements JV to the Subordination Agreement. 
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Bank's Respondent's Brief, paragraph E, page 30 is its 
claim that JV was properly excluded from the trial. The 
Bank goes on to acknowledge that proper due process requires 
some process to insure the individual is not deprived of his 
rights, and the Bank states, mainly "an individual must be 
provided with notice and opportunity to be heard" 
(Respondent's Brief, page 31). In response to the District 
Judge's Letter Order, JV filed an Objection and Motion to 
Set Aside the Court's Letter to Counsel. The District Court 
made no response, no hearing was offered, held, and the 
District Court proceeded through trial in total disregard of 
JV's procedural due process rights. Respondent Bank does 
not refer to any opportunity for JV to be heard but claims 
that because JV was provided opportunity to be heard on the 
first summary judgment and then on reconsideration. 
(Respondent's Brief, page 32, beginning paragraph). 
JV submits that prior hearings on summary judgment and 
reconsideration had nothing to do with the Court's Letter of 
April 30, 2014, which occurred subsequently, months later. 
The Respondent's Brief seems to entirely support JV's issue 
that JV was entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard. 
D. District Court's Refusal to Allow JV to discover 
the full Settlement Agreement by the Bank and its Debtors, 
POBD, BOLBY and MERSCHEL. 
The Respondent Bank that it was a matter of 
pure discretion for the District Judge to deny JV's motion 
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to discover the Bank's Restructure and Settlement Agreement 
between it and its debtor POBD, Merschel and Bolby. The 
Respondent Bank submitted as legal authority the rule that 
IRCP 26 (b} (1) permits broad discovery ... so long as it is 
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. {Respondent's Brief, page 29, first 
para, cases cited). 
JV's reply is: 
a} The Bank's attorney, in open court, had previously 
said, "I don't have a problem giving him the gl.obal 
settlement document." (Tr. Vol 2., p. 96, 11.9-11). This 
statement stipulation by Bank's counsel binds the Bank to 
furnish the document requested. 
b} The District Court entered a written Order which 
stated that he "it (sic) did not find the agreement to be 
relevant to the remaining issues in this case; however the 
document may lead to relevant evidence". (Order Re: 
Discovery, R. Vol. VII, p. 1539). 
In other words, the District Court did find the 
standard recognized by Respondent's Brief that discovery is 
permitted of any matter, "so long as it is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
The District Judge explicitly stated the rule permitting 
discovery of the matter (Settlement Agreement of the Bank 
and Debtor) could to discovery of 
admissible evidence. However, the District Court did not 
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define the "remaining issues" or how the document "may lead 
to discovery of relevant evidence". (This is at R., Vol. 
VII, page 1539-40; the Appellant's Brief, page 31, 3rct line, 
in error referred to it as Vol II, it is in fact in Vol. 
VII.) 
Only a "redacted" copy was furnished, and it is in 
evidence as Defendant NIR Exhibit SSS. In paragraph 3 
Reaffirmation of Obligations it was stated that all terms 
and conditions of the Loan Documents would remain in force 
and effect. The relevance of that provision is that the 
LOAN DOCUMENTS include a Collateral Pledge of cash by Bolby 
of 2.5 million and Marschel of 2.5 million, a total of $5.0 
million dollars in cash collateral that should have applied 
to almost entirely pay-off the Note and Mortgage to the 
Bank. 
Of a matter of course in the proceedings, JV was not 
heard on its motion to quash the Judge's Letter denying JV 
the right to sit at counsel table and participate in the 
trial. That also denied JV any opportunity to present the 
discoverable evidence of how, why, where, did the $5.0 
million Cash Collateral go? It was not applied to the loan 
at all, as the Bank was suing to foreclose a $5.0 million 
dollar Mortgage on the real estate when in fact it held 5.0 
million cash collateral to pay the Loan, without the need to 
the as to the first $5 0 cash was 
in fact held by the Bank as collateral. The Bank never 
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asserted that the full Settlement Agreement was privileged, 
nor did the District Court find it was privileged. 
JV submits it was denied discoverable knowledge of the 
facts of the $5.0 million cash collateral, which is a 
substantial prejudice to JV & NIR. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Respondent's Brief seeks attorney fees on this appeal, 
as a "commercial transaction" under Idaho Code §12-120(3). 
There was no commercial transaction between the parties, the 
Bank, and JV. The Bank was not a party to the Subordination 
Agreement, and the interest of JV was only as a Mortgage 
holder on the same real estate as the Bank's Mortgage. The 
Bank's Mortgage being recorded in 2008 and JV's Mortgage 
recorded in 2006. The only issue between the Bank and JV 
was the priority of each other's Mortgage on the same real 
estate. This action did not involve a "commercial 
transaction". The "gravamen" of the Bank's action against 
JV was not a commercial transaction because it is not 
integral to the claim upon which the Bank was seeking 
against JV. This action was primarily a priority as to real 
property dispute. (Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Ke1sey, 
131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041(1998). 
UNION BANK CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES BY IDAHO CODE §12-
121 
Union Bank claims the issues and Brief 
are brought or 1 unreasonably, or without 
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foundation. JV agrees that such is the standard under Idaho 
Code §12-121. 
JV submits that the factual record shows JV validly 
pursued having a priority mortgage on the real estate at 
issue. JV should have been entitled to judgment on the 
pleadings because the facts allege the date of recording for 
JV in 2006 and the Bank in 2008. There was not one word 
about "Subordination" (Agreement), as the prayer for relief 
is not part of the cause of action or factual allegation, it 
is only opinion of the pleader. The Affidavit of James 
Berry alleged substantial facts so that the facts were 
subject to genuine issues of material fact. The District 
Judge refused to consider JV's additional evidence on 
reconsideration of the interlocutory order of summary 
judgment. JV was denied discovery of evidence (Settlement 
Agreement) that the District Judge found would lead to 
discovery of relevant evidence. 
The Trial by the District Judge was ordered to be 
without JV having any participation. There was no 
opportunity to be heard and no meaningful hearing, at all. 
JV'S RELIEF ON ITS REPLY 
JV moves the Supreme Court to deny attorney fees to the 
Respondent Bank, and to reverse the District Court and to 
remand the matter to the District Court for new proceedings 
and a new trial. 
to find and hold 
JV moves the 
JV had the first priori 
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Court 
recorded June 19, 2006 and the Bank held a subsequently 
recorded mortgage recorded March 25, 2008. The 
Subordination Agreement did not bind JV as a contract, there 
was no consideration, and it was obtained by fraud in the 
inducement. Because the Subordination Agreement was 
recorded August 6, 2008, over 4 months after the Bank's 
Mortgage, so the Bank could not be a third party 
beneficiary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~~ day of December, 2015. 
Gary A. Finney 
Attorney for Appellant JV 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing was served as indicated, this day 
of September, 2015, and addressed as follows: 
Christopher Pooser 
Stoehl Rives, LLC 
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900 
Boise, ID 83702-7705 
VIA US MAIL 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
VIA US MAIL 
-12-
recorded June 19, 2006 and the Bank held a subsequently 
recorded mortgage recorded March 25, 2008. The 
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